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Abstract -
  
 
Purpose: The objective of this study is to examine the persistence of bank asset quality on 
bank lending behaviour in Ghana.
 
Data/Methodology: Using a dataset from the Bank of Ghana for 25 Ghanaian banks from 2005 to 
2010, the study employed a random effects (RE) model with AR(1) and heteroskedastic disturbances to 
test the relationship between bank lending behaviour proxied as the ratio loans and advances to total 
asset and bank asset quality (ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loans and advances) while controlling 
for deposit mobilization,
 
equity, management efficiency, intermediation spread and income diversification.  
 
Findings: The empirical estimation found that the effect of the deterioration of bank asset quality 
(high levels of non-performing loans) on bank lending behaviour is persistence and not 
contemporaneous. Additionally, bank deposit mobilization, intermediation spread and equity were also 
found to influence bank lending behaviour. 
 
Originality/Value: This paper is the first study to examine the persistence impact of the three 
classes of asset quality on bank intermediation functions in Ghana.
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Abstract -
 
Purpose:
 
The objective of this study is to examine 
the persistence of bank asset quality on bank lending 
behaviour in Ghana.
 
 
 
Findings: The empirical estimation found that the 
effect of the deterioration of bank asset quality (high levels of 
non-performing loans) on bank lending behaviour is 
persistence and not contemporaneous. Additionally, bank 
deposit mobilization, intermediation spread and equity were 
also found to influence bank lending behaviour.
 
Originality/Value: This paper is the first study to 
examine the persistence impact of the three classes of asset 
quality on bank intermediation functions in Ghana.
 
 
 
I.
 Background of the Study 
 
 
  
 
 
Author α  : Department of Finance,
School, Legon, Ghana. 
 
 
 
A deterioration in a banks’ asset quality serve 
as indicator of the risk levels being assumed by banks, 
hence tighten credit standards leading to a reduction in 
future banks’ lending to reduce  its risk levels. The 
impact of bank asset quality on lending behaviour is 
both direct and indirect. With the direct effect, a 
deterioration in bank loan assets indicates that banks 
are taking on high risks and hence banks cannot build 
up its risk levels ad infinatum,  they tighten credit 
standards which will reduce the number of loan 
applicants as well as successful loan applicants. With 
the indirect effect, incurring losses from non-performing 
loans demands loan write-offs which depletes the equity 
capital of banks. This would in-turn affect the bank's 
ability to write more loan businesses, hence reduction in 
lending, called the capital crunch by Richard Syron 
former president of the Boston Federal Reserve  
(Bernanke et. al., 1991).
 
With the asset quality posing a threat to the 
financial stability of the banking sector (IMF, 2011), this 
study seeks to examine the persistence of bank asset 
quality of Ghanaian banks on the lending behaviour of 
Ghanaian banks. The rest of the paper is organized into 
section 2 focused on stylized facts about the Ghanaian 
banking industry, section 3 reviews the empirical 
literature, methodology is discussed in section 4 and 
discussion of findings dealt in section 5. Section 6 
concludes
 
the study.
 
II.
 
Overview of Ghanaian Banks
 
The first bank to be established in West Africa 
was the branch of Africa Banking Corporation of South 
Africa (ABC) in September 1891 in Lagos, Nigeria. Due 
to disputes with local powerful merchants, the directors 
of ABC with their predominately South African interest 
withdrew from Lagos in March, 1893. However, one Sir 
Alfred Jones and his assistant bought the Lagos office 
of ABC and incorporated a new banking company to 
take over the ABC Lagos branch, Known as the Bank of 
British West Africa Ltd (BBWA), the new bank was 
registered in the UK on 30th March 1894 (Anin, 2000). A 
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)
C
ρ
σ ρ University of Ghana Business 
ommercial banks are the most important savings, 
mobilization and financial resource allocation 
institutions. Consequently, these roles make them 
an important phenomenon in economic growth and 
development. In performing this role, it must be realized 
that banks have the potential, scope and prospects for 
mobilizing financial resources and allocating them to 
productive investments. Both theoretical and empirical 
finance literature suggests that the availability of bank 
credit is important determinants of economic growth 
and development in developing economies. However 
evidence shows that banks in these economies are 
Many firms especially those in developing 
economies rely on banks for financing since capital 
markets in those countries may not be well-developed 
and efficient. These firms that are rather small and 
medium-scaled cannot finance their projects by  issuing 
C
securities in financial markets. They usually borrow 
funds at loanable funds market from financial institutions 
and often through banks. Therefore, changes in credit 
supply directly affect the investment projects and 
budget constraints of firms and thus their spending 
decisions (Saarenheime, 1995).
Data/Methodology: Using a dataset from the Bank of 
Ghana for 25 Ghanaian banks from 2005 to 2010, the study 
employed a random effects (RE) model with AR(1) and 
heteroskedastic disturbances to test the relationship between 
bank lending behaviour proxied as the ratio loans and 
advances to total asset and bank asset quality (ratio of non-
performing loans to gross loans and advances) while 
controlling for deposit mobilization, equity, management 
efficiency, intermediation spread and income diversification.
reluctant to extend long-term credit to private busi-
nesses. Some factors influencing this reluctance are the 
unstable local government economic policies and the 
riskiness and opacity of business borrowers in these 
countries Djiogap and Ngomsi (2012).
Keywords : asset quality, non-performing loans, bank 
lending, persistence, deposit, equity, ghana.
followed by the opening of new branches in Sekondi 
(1902) and Kumasi (1906). The BBWA’s expansion 
programme closely followed the parallel expansion of 
both the rail and the road development programme of 
the colonial government with the result that by 1916, 12 
branches of the Bank had been opened in Accra, 
Sekondi, Obuasi, Tarkwa, Prestea, Half-Assini, Cape 
Coast, Kumasi, Winneba, Axim, Nsawam and Koforidua.
 
The BBWA enjoyed banking monopoly at this 
time. However, this monopoly ended in 1917 with the 
establishment in Accra of a branch of the Colonial Bank 
which had since 1836, operated in the West Indies, Anin 
(2000). Soon after the end of the First World War, the 
colonial bank expanded its branch network by opening 
branches in Sekondi and Kumasi. In 1925, Barclays 
concluded all the financial agreement which led to the 
merger of the colonial bank, the Anglo Egyptian Bank 
and the National Bank of South Africa to form a new 
bank known as Barclays DCO (Dominion, Colonial and 
Overseas). Thus, in 1926 the six branches of the 
Colonial Bank became branches of the Barclays Bank 
(DCO).
 
Financial distress afflicted all the public sector 
banks in the 1980s. The DFIs appear to have run into 
serious difficulties first, while the emergence of distress 
in the two main commercial Banks, GCB and SSB was 
delayed until the mid-1980s. All the banks were 
rendered insolvent by non-performing assets (NPAs) 
and had to be restructured in 1989-91. The NPAs 
included non-performing loans, letters of credit and 
equity investments which yielded no income. Non-
performing loans amounted to ₵32 billion, representing 
41% of all outstanding loans to the non-government 
sector (Kapur et al, 1991, pp 60-61). 
After 1983, the banking sector saw a lot of 
reforms and entry of new banks into the country. 
Financial Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP II and 
I), Non-Performing Assets Recovery Trust (NPART) and 
the Foreign 41 Exchange Bureau legislation. A new 
Banking Law was also promulgated. Aside these 
reforms, prudential regulations were enacted to protect 
the stability of the financial system and deposits in 
ensuring the safety and soundness of the banking 
system. . The banking laws instituted in the Ghana since 
the financial distress of state banks include, the Banking 
Law, 1989 (P.N.D.C.L. 225), Bank of Ghana Act 2002, 
Act 612, the Banking Act, 2004 (Act 673) and the 
Banking Amendment Act 2007, (Act 783).
 
The new banks that entered the Ghanaian 
banking scene included; Ecobank, First Atlantic Bank, 
Continental Acceptances (now Cal Bank), Metropolitan 
and Allied Bank, Prudential Bank, Meridian/ The Trust 
Bank, International Commercial bank, Unibank, UT 
bank, Bank of Baroda, Sahel Sahara bank, Stanbic 
bank, HFC Bank, Amalgamated Bank and recently 
Standard Trust Bank (now United Bank of Africa, UBA), 
Zenith Bank, Intercontinental Bank, Access Bank and 
Guaranty Trust Bank all of Nigerian origin. Thus the 
banking system in Ghana consists of the Central Bank 
(BoG), 26 banks and about 151 Rural Banks. The rural 
banks are supervised by the ARB Apex Bank under the 
direction of Bank of Ghana.
 
Various products have
 
been developed in the 
banking industry over the last decade. Automated teller 
machines (ATMs) have become common giving clients 
the freedom to transact business at their own 
convenience. Also home banking, for example 
telephone banking, SMS banking and internet banking 
have been introduced. the Payment Systems Act 2003 
(Act 662) empowered the BoG to establish, operate, 
promote and supervise payment, fund transfers, 
clearing and settlement systems, subject to rules as it 
may publish and to designate any other payment, fund 
transfers, clearing and settlement systems operating in 
the country which the BoG considers to be in the public 
interest for it to supervise under the PSA. This lead to 
the roll out of rolled out the e-zwich, a national payment 
and settlements system that creates an electronic 
clearing house for all banking and financial institutions, 
as well as a biometric smartcard which is a very secure 
way of paying for goods and services.
 
Credit Reporting Act 2007 (Act 726) led to the 
creation of the credit reference bureau which is a 
repository of credit information and neutral entity that 
collates consumer credit information by soliciting 
creditors such as banks and other lending institutions to 
contribute and share their credit information on 
consumers. The main importance of the reference 
bureau is to bridge the information asymmetry in credit 
markets.
 
The Cheque Codeline Clearing (CCC) system 
was introduced in January 2010 to enable banks and 
other financial institutions to speed up the processing 
and settlement of cheque transactions. Under the 
system, depositors of cheques are expected to get 
value within three days.
 
III.
 
Determinants of Bank Lending
 
Behaviour
 
: Related Studies
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C
branch of BBWA was established in Accra in 1896 
a) Asset Quality
The level of non-performing loans in bank’s loan 
an indication of the profitability bank lending activities. It 
requires the provision for write-offs of either portions or 
all of the loans. The write-offs are losses that the banks 
absorb with its equity capital, hence the banks 
reluctance to take new risks and commit new 'loans 
which is described as the credit crunch'. Lower bank 
asset quality signals banks as to their risk levels, 
therefore their reluctance to take on more risk through 
lending. This variable is entered in the model in both 
levels and lags forms. Amidu and Hinson (2006) found a 
portfolio depicts the quality of bank loans which gives an 
This study posits that it’s
 
rather the experience from 
giving bad loans that influences banks decision to 
extend more credit.
 
b)
 
Deposits
 
Deposits forms majority of banks liabilities and 
plays an important role in the intermediation activities of 
banks. The decisions of banks management to lend are
 
greatly influenced by the volume and
 
cost of deposits to 
the banks. The interest paid on deposits ensures that 
banks should earn return over and above their cost of 
funds, hence the transformation of these liabilities to 
loan assets to generate interest income. The larger the 
volume of bank deposits, the more loan able
 
funds 
available to the banks, hence the higher likelihood of 
given out more loans and advances.
 
A positive relationship is thus expected between 
deposits and bank lending behaviour. The deposits ratio 
is measured as the ratio of customer deposits to total 
bank liabilities.
 
c)
 
Management Efficiency
 
The quality of banks’ management is captured 
by the expenses they pay their employees with a highly 
skilled work force attracting higher salaries. A highly 
skilled banking staff are assumed to have better 
appreciation of loan markets, hence are able to 
differentiate bad loan from good ones, hence the less 
likelihood of granting loans which have low probability of 
default.
 
d)
 
Equity Ratio
 
The equity ratio is an indication of the risk 
characteristics which is risk aversion. Bank capitalization 
can affect bank willingness and ability to extend long-
term loans in several different ways. Banks with larger 
capital cushion against credit risks should have higher 
capacity to extend risky, long-term loans. Therefore 
increasing bank equity
 
enhances the bank’s capacity to 
increase lending. Bank capitalization is measured by the 
book equity to assets ratio. In addition, better capitalized 
banks can attract more creditworthy borrowers that will 
qualify for longer term loans. Alternatively, high levels of 
capital can reveal risk averse and conservatively 
managed banks that may be reluctant to issue risky 
long-term loans. Bouvatier and
 
Lepetit (2007) and 
Djiogap and Ngomsi
 
(2012) found that poorly 
capitalized banks are constrained to expand credit. 
 
e)
 
Income Diversification
 
The diversification of banking activities serves to 
stabilise bank income by focusing other sources of bank 
income which leads to decreased intermediation 
activities. This study proxies diversification as the ratio of 
non-interest income to total income. A negative 
relationship is expected between diversification and 
bank lending since diversification ensures that banks 
use its resources in non-interest generating activities. 
 
f)
 
Intermediation Spread
 
The spread between interest income and 
expense gives an indication of bank profitability. A 
higher spread means lending is profitable and thus 
profit driven bank management are more likely to lend 
more. Therefore, it is expected that higher interest 
margin will induce banks to give out more loans and 
advances. On the other hand, a higher spread gives an 
indication of a costly lending business leading to low 
risk borrowers being charged above average rates. This 
would reduce the loan customers, hence demand for 
loanable funds.
 
The point of
 
departure of this study from 
literature (ie Amidu and Hinson, 2006) lies in its 
methodological approach. The often used non-
performing loan ratio was used as a proxy for bank 
lending whereas it was hypothesised that the asset 
quality also has a persistence effect on bank lending 
behaviour. This study hypothesizes that, after building 
up its loan portfolio, there is a year's lag assessment of 
the performance of the portfolio by management after 
which decisions are made as to whether to continue 
expanding their loan portfolio to be more profitable or 
concentrate its efforts on improving its existing portfolio.
 
IV.
 
Data and Methodology
 
This research considered 25 banks in Ghana 
covering the period from 2005 to 2010 using annual 
bank data. The data was obtained from the Bank of 
Ghana which serves as the regulatory body for 
Ghanaian banks. A pooled time series cross-section 
analysis was employed in the analysis of the data. 
 
a)
 
Measures of Asset Quality
 
In line with literature, this study posits the use of 
the non-performing loans ratio as a proxy for bank asset 
quality (ASQ) which is measured as the ratio of non-
performing loans to gross loans and advance. Making 
use of a unique dataset which decomposes the non-
performing loans into substandard loans ratio (SSLR), 
doubtful loans ratio (DLR) and loss loans (LLR). A more 
robust evidence is brought to the studies by also using 
the ratios of the three classes of non-performing loans 
as proxies for assets quality.
 
b)
 
Empirical Model
  
To examine the impact of asset quality on bank 
lending behaviour, the study estimated the model below 
which was adopted and modified from Olokoyo (2011) 
and Djiogap and Ngomsi
 
(2012) for the panel data 
analysis. 
Does Asset Quality Persist on Bank Lending Behaviour? Empirical Evidence from Ghana
contemporaneous between bank lending and credit risk. 
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C
                                                             
    
is the ratio of loans and advances to 
total assets for bank i in period t, represents 
the lag of asset quality,  is the banks’ assets 
quality, the non-performing loans ratio for bank i in 
period t,  is the loss loan ratio for bank i in period 
t,  is the lag of loss loan ratio,  is the 
doubtful loan ratio for bank i in period t,  is the 
lag of doubtful loan ratio,  is the substandard 
loan ratio for bank i in period t, is the lag of 
substandard loan ratio, , the ratio of bank 
deposits to total liabilities of bank i in period 
t, , the interest spread for bank i in time 
t, , proxied as the ratio of non-interest 
income to total income for bank i in time t   
represents the ratio of staff and administration expenses 
to total operating expenditure for bank i at time 
t, , the ratio of equity to total assets for bank i in 
time t, , and  is the error term for bank i in time  
while  is the firm-specific fixed effects. 
Table 4.1 : Expected Results 
VARIABLE
 
SYMBOL
 EXPECTED 
SIGN 
Asset Quality.L1 
 
Negative 
Asset Quality ASQ Negative 
Loss Loan Ratio.L1       
 
Negative 
Loss Loan Ratio LLR Negative 
Doubtful Loan Ratio.L1 
 
Negative 
Doubtful Loan Ratio DLR Negative 
Substandard Loan Ratio.L1 
 
Negative 
Substandard Loan Ratio SSLR Negative 
Deposit Ratio DEP Positive 
Management Efficiency MEFF Negative 
Equity EQR Positive 
Income Diversification INCDIV Positive 
Interest Spread   NITI Negative 
c) Estimation Technique 
The tendency for a correlation between the 
unobservable heterogeneity  of each firm and the 
explanatory variables of the model makes the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) biased. If there is a 
correlation,  or 
, it would be possible to obtain the 
consistent   estimation    by  means  of  the  within-group   
estimator of fixed effects. Otherwise (random effects) a 
more efficient estimator can be achieved by estimating 
the equation by generalized least squares (GLS). The 
normal strategy to determine whether the effects are 
fixed or random is to use the Hausman (1978) test under 
the null hypothesis of random effects model. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, the effects are considered to be 
fixed, and the model is then estimated by OLS. If the null 
hypothesis is accepted, there would be random effects, 
and the model is then estimated by GLS, which 
according to Baltagi (1995) allows the Random Effects 
Model to support inference for the population, assuming 
the sample is representative of the underlying 
population. 
 
 
Does Asset Quality Persist on Bank Lending Behaviour? Empirical Evidence from Ghana
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C
   
  
assets as to make loans (loans forms 67 percent of 
 
 
Table 5.1 : Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 LEND ASQ LLR DLR SSLR DEPR NITI INCDIV MEFF EQR 
Mean 0.67 0.115 0.058 0.031 0.026 0.74 8.67 0.39 0.54 0.14 
Std. Dev. 0.83 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.15 69.89 0.12 31.53 0.11 
Minimum 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.29 0.12 0.35 0.03 
Maximum .550 0.70 0.54 0.29 0.14 0.99 .813 0.71 0.361 0.76 
N 140 140 140 140 140 141 141 141 141 137 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
LEND 1          
ASQ -0.059 1         
LLR -0.050 0.88*** 1        
DLR -0.092 0.76*** 0.47*** 1       
SSLR 0.023 0.51*** 0.17* 0.38*** 1      
DEPR 0.140* 0.016 0.0007 0.05 -0.01 1     
NITI -0.075 -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 0.044 1    
INCDIV -0.128 -0.14* -0.20** 0.03 -0.05 0.024 -0.01 1   
MEFF -0.069 -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 0.112 0.25*** -0.06 1  
EQR 0.36*** -0.1 -0.09 -0.09 -0.04 0.177 -0.015 -0.21** -0.03 1 
 
The strength of relationships among the 
independents can affect the regression coefficients. In 
order to arrive at robust and consistent estimates, a 
correlation coefficient was estimated to measure the 
strength of the relationship among the independent 
variables. The results as presented in Table 5.1 
indicates a weaker relationships among the independent 
variables hence the issue of multi-collinearity with the 
independent variables which produces biased 
regression estimates was avoided.
 
b)
 
Regression Results
 
Panel regression is also estimated depending 
on the relationship between the unobserved terms and 
the explanatory variables. To determine the whether to 
use the random effects or fixed effects estimation, a 
Hausman (1978) specification test was carried out with 
the null hypothesis that difference in coefficients is not 
systematic. The results for four models do not reject the 
null hypothesis that random effects estimation provides 
consistent and unbiased estimates of the regression 
Does Asset Quality Persist on Bank Lending Behaviour? Empirical Evidence from Ghana
Lend=Gross Loans/Assets ASQ=Non-performing Loans Ratio, LLR=Loss Loan Ratio, DLR=Doubtful 
Loan Ratio, SLR= Substandard Loan Ratio, DEP=Deposits/Total Liabilities, MEFF=Staff and 
Administration Expenses/Total Expenditure EQR=Equity Ratio NITI=Net Interest Income/Total Income, 
INCDIV=Non-Interest Income/Total Income,
 ©  2013 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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C
V. Discussion of Findings
a) Summary Statistics and Test for Multicollinearity 
The study sought to establish the impact of 
bank asset quality on bank lending over the study 
period. An empirical model was estimated with bank 
lending, the dependent variable measured as the ratio 
gross loans and advances to total assets while the 
independent variables included the lag of asset quality, 
asset quality, deposit ratio, management efficiency, 
equity ratio, income diversification and net interest 
spread. The summary statistics of the variables are 
displayed in Table 5.8. From the table, the mean value 
of bank lending (LEND), 0.6706 indicates that an 
average Ghanaian banks uses 67.06 percent of its 
banks total assets), with the deposit ratio (DEPR) of 
0.7394 also indicating that most banks liabilities are 
sourced from deposits. This implies that the banks are 
more focused on their intermediation activities of 
deposit taking and granting of loans. Management 
efficiency (MEFF), measured as the ratio of staff and 
administration expenses to operational expenses has a 
mean of 0.7738 indicating that the banks spend 77.38 
percent of their income on staff and administration 
costs. The means for equity ratio (EQR), interest spread 
(INTSPRD), income diversification (INCDIV) and asset 
quality (ASQ) are 0.1428, 0.6366, 38.91 and 0.1157 
respectively. 
were found to be serially correlated and 
heteroskedastic, hence the random effects model was 
estimated taking into account the behaviour of the 
disturbance terms.
 
For the random effects models, the Wald 
 
results (Prob > 
 
= 0.0000) indicates a rejection of the 
null hypothesis implying that that the independent 
variables jointly explains the variations in bank lending.  
The R-squared of 0.6366, 0.6615, 0.5980, 0.6325 
indicates that 63.66 percent, 66.15 percent, 59.80 
percent and 63.35 percent variations in bank lending 
behaviour is explained by the models 1, 2, 3 and 4 
respectively as shown in table 5.2. The results of the 
random effects (RE) estimation as shown in Table 5.2 
find a significant negative relationship between the lags 
of asset quality (ASQ.L1), loss loan (LLR.L1), doubtful 
loan (DLR.L1) and bank lending. Also, deposits ratio 
(DEPR), management efficiency (MEFF) and equity ratio 
(EQR) were found to significantly influence the lending 
behaviour of Ghanaian banks as measured by the ratio 
of gross loans and advances to total assets. 
 
Table 5.2 : Random Effects Model with First Order Autocorrelation and Heteroskedastic Disturbances 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE : BANK LENDING 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.109 (0.29) 0.074 (0.2) 0.073 (0.18) -0.042 (-0.1) 
ASQ.L1 -0.809 (-1.99)**    
ASQ -0.198 (-0.39)    
LLR.L1  -1.279 (-1.92)*   
LLR  -0.154 (-0.13)   
DLR.L1   -1.916 (-1.96)**  
DLR   -1.542 (-1.4)  
SSLR.L1    -0.832 (-0.33) 
SSLR    0.215 (0.12) 
DEPR 0.826 (2.14)** 0.849 (2.25)** 0.797 (1.97)** 0.788 (2.13)** 
NITI -0.003 (-0.84) -0.004 (-0.93) -0.003 (-0.63) -0.003 (-0.91) 
INCDIV -0.850 (-1.0) -0.901 (-1.09) -0.755 (-0.86) -0.698 (-0.76) 
MEFF -0.002 (-2.86)*** -0.002 (-2.47)** -0.002 (-2.71)*** -0.001 (-2.41)** 
EQR 3.503 (2.69)*** 3.528 (2.67)*** 3.613 (2.83)*** 3.656 (2.83)*** 
MODEL DIAGNOSTICS 
Wald  (7)        67.09***
 61.22*** 74.39*** 61.5*** 
R-square 0.6366 0.6615 0.5980 0.6325 
Adj. R-square 0.6124 0.6389 0.5712 0.6080 
BP-CW Hettest  (1) 111.11***
 114.77*** 112.34*** 108.43*** 
AR(1)  F( 1, 21) 16.857*** 18.857*** 15.984*** 9.182*** 
Hausman  (7) 3.98
 3.82 9.31 4.85 
Prob>  0.7826
 0.8008 0.2314 0.6781 
Number of Banks   25 25 25 25 
Observations     113 113 113 113 
 
The lag of asset quality was found to be 
negatively related to bank lending. This can be 
explained that current levels of a bank’s non-performing 
loans to mean an unprofitable lending business, hence 
the banks reluctance to extend more credit in future. 
Higher levels of non-performing loans (lower asset 
quality) inhibit the bank’s ability to extend more credit 
since it will concentrate its efforts on improving on the 
performance of its current loan portfolio. This finding 
supports the credit crunch theory (Bernanke et al. 1991) 
that problem loans (non-performing) clog credit 
channels making it difficult for businesses and 
households to obtain credit. This relationship is 
significant at 5 percent. The coefficient of -0.809, which 
denote elasticity of lending with respect to bank asset 
quality indicates that a percent deterioration in asset 
quality reduces any future bank lending by 80.9 percent. 
Jordan et al. (2002) found that the cyclicality of loan loss 
provisions directly affects bank profits and bank capital 
which could influence the bank’s incentive to grant new 
loans. Amidu and Hinson (2006) and Bouvatier and 
Lepetit (2007) also provided evidence of the influence of 
asset quality on bank lending behaviour. However, this 
study finds that such a relationship is not 
contemporaneous but persistent as evident by the 
insignificant negative coefficient between asset quality 
Does Asset Quality Persist on Bank Lending Behaviour? Empirical Evidence from Ghana
***, ** and * denotes significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, z-statistics are in parentheses, 
BW/CW Hettest=Breusch-Pagan/Cook Weisberg Heteroskedasticity test, AR(1)=Autocorrelation test
© 2013  Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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model. On other model diagnostics, the error terms 
(ASQ) and bank lending. With the lags of the three 
classes of bank asset quality, both loss loan and 
doubtful loan ratios exhibited significant negative 
relationship with bank lending behaviour at 1 percent 
and 5 percent significance levels respectively. This 
supports the persistence impact of bank asset quality 
on lending behaviour. 
In terms of the deposit ratio, the z-statistics 
reveal that volume of deposits of banks liabilities is 
significant at 5 percent level with a positive coefficient in 
all four models, portraying that the amount of loanable 
funds banks are able attract positively impact on the 
banks’ lending behaviour. This means that, as banks 
continuously accumulate deposits which attract interest 
expense, they must generate enough returns to cover 
that interest expense and make profit hence, the 
extension of loans and advances to earn interest income 
cover their deposit cost. Similar relationship was found 
by Olokoyo (2011) in Nigeria and Bouvatier and Lepetit 
(2007) on European banks. Management inefficiencies 
also showed a negative relationship with lending 
behaviour.  
A positive and significant relationship was found 
between bank equity capital and lending behaviour 
confirming a priori expectation that riskier lending 
businesses culminating in loan write-offs depletes banks 
equity capital which affect banks capacity to take on 
more risk at a 5 percent significant level.. This finding 
supports the capital crunch argument of Richard Syron 
(cited by Bernanke et. al, 1991).  
Interest spread (NITI), a proxy for bank lending 
rate and the proxy for bank income diversification 
relationship with bank lending, Olokoyo (2011) found no 
significant relationship between bank lending and 
lending rate in Nigeria. 
VI. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The importance of the banking institutions as 
intermediaries in channeling funds from the surplus 
spending units to deficit spending units cannot be 
overemphasized with regards to its contributions to 
inhibits the banking institutions decisions to extend 
credit which is vital for growth has to be identified and 
remedied. In this direction, this study examined the 
relationship between bank lending behaviour and asset 
quality of Ghanaian banks. By employing a random 
effects (RE) estimation with both auto-correlated and 
heteroskedastic disturbance term to bank level data of 
25 banks from 2005 to 2010, a robust evidence on the 
determinants of bank lending behaviour in an 
environment where deteriorating bank asset quality 
poses a great challenge to the stability of the financial 
system. Banking lending was found to be the dominant 
function of Ghanaian banks over the study period. The 
banks (low bank asset quality) has a persistence and 
not contemporaneous effect on bank lending. Banks 
with poor loan portfolio reduces the loan originations in 
favour of improving the performance of its loan portfolio. 
Shortage of loanable funds, inefficient bank 
management and less-capitalized banks are more 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
   
 
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
  
 
  
empirical evidence that the deteriorating loan portfolio of 
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C
growth in developing countries. Therefore, factors that
(INCDIV) were found to have insignificant negative 
lend (credit slowdown/crunch). Based on the findings of 
the study, it is recommended that efforts should be 
made to improve the performance of bank loan 
portfolios and innovative ways devised to bring in more 
deposits to enhance bank lending in Ghana.
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